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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      GENESIS WILSON, et al.,
                      Plaintiffs,
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                                               10 Cv. 2709 (PGG)
                 V.
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      PASQUALE'S DAMARINO'S, INC.,
      et al.,
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                     Defendants.
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                                                July 20, 2012
10
                                                3:50 p.m.
      Before:
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                            HON. PAUL G. GARDEPHE
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                                                District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
15
      ROBERT WISNIEWSKI
           Attorney for Plaintiffs
16
      CAVANAGH & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
17
           Attorneys for Defendants
      BY: GLENN L. CAVANAGH
           JARRED S. FREEMAN
18
19
      Also present:
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           ANDREW C. RISOLI
           ANDREA RISOLI
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1 (Case called) THE DEPUTY CLERK: Is the plaintiff ready? 2 3 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Plaintiff is ready. Robert 4 Wisniewski for all plaintiffs. 5 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Defendants ready? 6 MR. ANDREW RISOLI: Andrew C. Risoli, 488 White Plains 7 Road, Eastchester, New York. MR. CAVANAGH: Glenn Cavanagh, Cavanagh & Associates. 8 9 MR. FREEMAN: Jarred Freeman, Cavanagh & Associates. 10 THE COURT: This matter is on my calendar for purposes 11 of considering the plaintiffs' application for a default 12 judgment. 13 This case was filed on March 26, 2010. The defendants 14 have repeatedly refused to pay their lawyers, which has led to 15 repeated changes in counsel and a complete disruption of 16 proceedings in this case. 17 The first lawyer was Adam Breud. He was terminated on January 3, 2011 by defendants. Mr. Breud withdrew because of a 18 19 fee dispute. 20 Robert Popescu was the second attorney. His services were terminated on March 11, 2011. The reasons why Mr. Popescu 21 22 withdrew are not clear from the record.

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At the April 5, 2011 conference, I said the following: "I don't want any further delay in the case. And, Mr. Cavanagh, you should instruct your clients that I have no more tolerance for jockeying around here. We are on our third set of lawyers. It has been incredibly disruptive. We have lost a year, in large part because of the jerking around between counsel. That has to stop. And if Mr. Marino has any further thoughts about changing counsel, the case will proceed with him on a pro se basis. So we are not going to tolerate any more delay."

Citing the April 5, 2011 transcript at page 25.

Despite that exchange, on January 27, 2012, a lawyer named Lorenzo Lugara sent a letter to Mr. Cavanagh stating that he had been retained to represent defendants Pasquale Marino, Izabela Marino, Salvatore Abbate and Pasquale DaMarino's, Inc, and that Mr. Cavanagh should do no more work on the case.

On January 30, 2012, Mr. Cavanagh sent to the Court, to me, executed substitution of attorney forms for all defendants, saying that he would file them later with the clerk's office. That filing never took place. Mr. Cavanagh's letter provided no explanation for the change in counsel or how it complied with my instructions at the April 5, 2011 conference that there would be no further substitution of counsel.

In a February 27, 2012 letter to the Court,
Mr. Cavanagh explained that the defendants Pasquale Marino,

Izabela Marino, Salvatore Abbate and Pasquale DaMarino's, Inc. had contacted him and told him that they had retained a new lawyer, Lorenzo Lugara. Once again, the defendants had refused to pay Mr. Cavanagh for the legal services he had rendered.

Mr. Cavanagh also asserted in his February 27, 2012 letter that a conflict of some sort had arisen in connection with his representation of the defendants. The letter does not make clear what the nature of that conflict is.

On February 29, 2012, I received a letter from Mr. Lugara stating that he had been retained by defendants Pasquale Marino, Izabela Marino, Salvatore Abbate and Pasquale DaMarino's, Inc. In his February 29, 2012 letter, Mr. Lugara asked the Court to permit a substitution of counsel yet again. Mr. Lugara stated that the defendants no longer had confidence in Mr. Cavanagh and that Mr. Cavanagh and all the prior lawyers in the matter had taken advantage of the defendants because they only spoke Italian. This assertion appears to be false on its face based on a video submitted by plaintiffs' counsel showing Mr. Marino speaking English quite fluently.

In a March 19, 2012 letter, the plaintiffs opposed the substitution of counsel request.

In an order dated April 5, 2012, I directed all defendants and Mr. Cavanagh to appear for an April 16, 2012 conference to resolve these issues. Neither the defendants nor counsel for the defendants appeared on that date.

On April 24, 2012, I received a letter from yet another attorney, Mr. Risoli, who is here in court this afternoon. In his April 24 letter, Mr. Risoli represented that he had been retained as counsel for defendants, representing I guess the sixth lawyer to have appeared on behalf of the defendants or to seek to appear on behalf of the defendants.

On April 27, 2012, I issued an order directing the defendants to show cause by May 4, 2012 why sanctions should not be imposed for their failure to appear at the April 16 conference. Defendants did not respond in any fashion to the order to show cause. As a result, on June 1, 2012, I directed the plaintiffs to make a motion for default judgment. Plaintiffs filed that motion on July 3, 2012, and the hearing on that motion was ultimately set for today.

Let me also say that Mr. Cavanagh has never moved to be relieved as counsel for defendants, and he remains counsel of record today. Mr. Cavanagh's sending me substitution of counsel forms did not relieve him as counsel of record. Our local rules, and specifically local civil rule 1.4, requires an attorney who is seeking to be relieved to make an application for leave of court. This rule requires that the attorney seeking to withdraw must support his or her application with an affidavit. "Such an order may be granted only upon a showing by affidavit or otherwise of satisfactory reasons for withdrawal or displacement in the posture of the case."

Accordingly, I will require a motion and supporting affidavit here before acting on Mr. Cavanagh's request to withdraw.

As to Mr. Lugara's and Mr. Risoli's applications to appear on behalf of defendants, and I might say it's entirely unclear to me who defendants are seeking to have represent them at this point, those requests are denied. I cannot allow this case to be disrupted any further by substitutions of counsel. I made clear more than a year ago, when Mr. Cavanagh came into the case as the third lawyer for defendants, that there would be no further changes of counsel in light of the disruption that the changes in counsel had already caused. And I made clear that defendants' only option going forward would be to proceed pro se in the event that they couldn't proceed with Mr. Cavanagh.

I should also say that Mr. Lugara's letter appears to have been sent in bad faith, given that it alleges that defendants' prior attorneys took advantage of them because of their inability to speak English. That appears to have been a false assertion.

I have received no satisfactory explanation for the defendants' failure to appear at the April 16, 2012 conference or to respond to the April 27, 2012 order to show cause.

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: (Continued) I received a July 5, 2012 letter from Mr. Cavanaugh apologizing for not responding to the Court's prior orders saying that he had not been receiving notifications from Pacer. I can't imagine why this would be so. But assuming arguendo it is so, Mr. Cavanaugh had an obligation to keep track of developments in the case until he was relieved, and he was never relieved as counsel.

So we have pending before us a motion for default judgment. I will hear anything that anyone wants to say on the subject, but that is the history here, and it is a sorry tale. I will tell you that I am considering very seriously entering a default judgment against the defendants because of this record.

Does anyone wish to speak?

MR. WISNIEWSKI: Your Honor, Robert Wisniewski, plaintiff's counsel. We submitted to you several legal authorities which we feel are directly on point. The one that is almost identical, except for the fact that it was the plaintiff, not the defendants, who failed to obey the Court's orders is Edwards v. Horn. It is a decision by Magistrate Judge James Cott, about whom you spoke about previously. And the citation is 2012 WL 1292672.

THE COURT: What's the name of the case again?

MR. WISNIEWSKI: Edwards v. Horn. The case was identical. The Court in Edwards issued an order for a scheduling conference. Plaintiff, one of the litigants, did

not appear. The Court issued another order rescheduling the conference at which the litigant did not appear. And, finally, the Court issued a report and recommendation which was subsequently accepted by the District Judge Sullivan in which it laid out the case history and on those facts applied the Second Circuit precedent Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 -- I'm sorry, it's a Supreme Court precedent. 370 U.S. 626.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. WISNIEWSKI: It's Link v. Wabash Railroad

Corporation, 370 U.S. 626, pinpoint citation 630. It's a 1962

case. Also Shannon v. General Electric Company, 186 F. 3d 186,

and pinpoint citations 193-94.

The Court in *Edwards* considered five factors, and you've enumerated in your presentation of the case that it's a sorry case history, the factors such as the duration of the litigant's default, the fact that the litigant did receive notice that sanctions would be considered against him.

What I would like to focus on before you today is on the third factor considered by the *Edwards* Court, which is whether the opposing side would be prejudiced by further delay.

I should like to add to your statement the fact that we have lost another year since April 2011. After

Mr. Cavanaugh was retained, you directed the defendants to respond to all outstanding discovery demands by July. The defendants did not respond to discovery demands by July.

Mr. Cavanaugh advised me that he had had great difficulty obtaining documents from the defendants, and that was the reason for his inability to comply with your discovery order.

As a result, on October 12, 2011 I wrote to you a 20-page letter detailing the outstanding discovery, written discovery, your Honor. We're talking about responses to interrogatories and document requests. Pursuant to my letter, you sent the case for discovery issues to Magistrate Judge Francis.

Now, subsequently, as you know, there were third-party actions instituted by the defendants, and as a result of these third-party actions and the third-party defendants' desire not to spend the money until their motions to dismiss those third-party complaints were resolved, Judge Francis issued an order in with he suspended discovery until you resolved those third-party actions.

In January of this year, the circus with the attorneys began again. So, at the very least, your Honor, since January until today we have lost, what, seven months, seven months in this case.

Now, I want you to consider the following: This case is brought by waitresses, young waitresses. The witnesses in this case are generally young people, young waitresses. I venture to say that two and a half years after this case began a substantial majority of people that I would want to call as

witnesses have already moved on. They changed their telephone numbers, email addresses, and if you allow this case to continue, your Honor, I would have extreme difficulty locating these witnesses because of the transient nature of restaurant employees.

And another situation is this: I now have a class action trial before Judge Glasser which will happen in September or October. The case had been sent to an arbitration — to a mediation, and if there is no resolution, I have class action trial which will take an enormous amount of time.

I also have been advised by my mother that I have to go back to Poland to help her in moving into a nursing home because of her frailty. I'm an only child and she has no other family members, your Honor. I will have to ask for extensions of time in about 50 cases that I'm handling.

Your Honor, so realistically if you were to allow this case to continue, I would be able to deal with the outstanding written discovery realistically sometime in October.

Another reason is, for example, that the associate who handled this case has left the firm. I have a new associate who is not familiar with this case or with all the discovery issues. So, I want you to consider this very seriously because in this case it's a very important factor.

We have lost a year, as you noted, plus seven months,

close to two years on this business with changing attorneys. You've correctly identified the scheme here, Judge. It's retaining new attorneys, OK, having them run up the bill and then refusing to pay, and then moving on and then moving on.

And the purpose of sanctions is not only to punish the miscreant, but also to deter such conduct in future cases. And that is a seminal case National Hockey League v. The Hockey Club, and it is cited in the Edwards decision, your Honor.

So I want you to consider not only the conduct here but also the deterrent value of your decision to others who will want to deploy the same maneuver as the defendants have done in this case, which is to change attorneys, run up the bill and switching attorneys from one to another and the effect that such a tactic has on the litigants, your Honor.

Now, you also have to consider whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate here — that's in the Edwards decision citing the Shannon v. General Electric — but lesser sanctions will not resolve the problem because of the situation, your Honor. It will take me and my personnel days to locate the witnesses we expected to call, OK? We will be — if we are unable to locate these witnesses, we will have six women claiming they were sexually harassed and there will be four or five defendants clearly telling a different story. And because of our inability to find credible witnesses, third-party witnesses, we will be prejudiced by that immensely.

Also, in considering default -- because for all practical purposes the defendants have defaulted here -- you have to consider two things: Excusable neglect, which you clearly didn't find here, and also the substance and merit to the defendant's defenses.

As we presented to you in our application, the defendants do not have any defenses to the waitresses' and other employees' claims for wage violations. Their own documents speak for themselves. They're in clear violation of the New York Labor Law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the wage orders promulgated under both the state and federal statutes. So the only defenses they have are the claims or the denials by Mr. Marino that he didn't sexually harass these women. OK?

Now, I think it is important to mention something here. You uttered the same words to us, to me and Mr. Breud that I heard you say previously; that this case cries out for an early settlement. We did go to a settlement conference, your Honor, when we filed the original action, and because of Mr. Risoli's outrageous statements in his letters, I need to advise you of something, which is very important because these women knew defendant Izabela Marino, they didn't want in public pleadings initially, they didn't want -- and because of the involvement of a rather very well-known actor and the fear that tabloids in New York may pick up the story, they didn't want to

publicize initially that claim.

They filed a claim for wage violations, but at the settlement conference we did discuss wage violations and sexual harassment claims, OK? There was a suggestion by Judge Francis that to move on with the mediation perhaps the parties should agree to take the lie detector test. Guess who refused to take the lie detector test, your Honor? And you should consider this when you consider whether the defendants have a substance and merit to their defenses.

So, for the reasons that we put forth in our application, and based on the reasons that I have just presented here, plaintiffs do request that you enter default against all defendants.

I also wish to remind the Court that the corporation itself, if you relieve Mr. Cavanaugh from representing them, will have automatically defaulted because it will not have been represented by an attorney.

So, I think that for all these reasons, you should enter default against all defendants. Thank you.

THE COURT: Does anyone else wish to be heard?

MR. CAVANAUGH: Yes, your Honor, briefly.

Your Honor, without question, there was miscommunication with regards to those court orders, your Honor, and that was with no malice. We had a server issue. The building we were in, we lost all power lines and

information lines. It took us almost a month and a half to get back, and we did -- we lost many different things with regards to our telecommunications, our internet and various things. When we found out and were alerted to this, we immediately notified the Court, apologized to the Court.

At this point, your Honor, I would ask that we be allowed to file the papers to be relieved as counsel, but at the same time we were under the belief that Mr. Lugara had filed all these things. Obviously, we were wrong. Mr. Lugara obviously didn't file anything. But subsequently, your Honor, I don't think there is any reason for the defendants here to be sanctioned. If the Court would be so indulgent as to let us file and be relieved as counsel, I think making plaintiffs go on pro se is punishment enough.

THE COURT: You mean making defendants go on pro se.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Thank you, your Honor, yes.

MR. RISOLI: If it please your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Risoli, go ahead.

MR. RISOLI: Your Honor, the defendants have never asked for a delay in this case. There was a one-year delay built in by four amended complaints which took over a year to answer. The original complaint contained no allegation of sexual harassment. It wasn't until six months later that the first amended complaint alleged that, and by Mr. Wisniewski's statement just now, it seems like it was offered to end this

case by blackmail. They wouldn't bring any sexual harassment Mr. Marino would pay him close to two or \$300,000 for the wage-related claim.

When we took over this case, we immediately moved into the criminal case, disposed of it on trial, which it no longer exists, right? We're ready for trial. If he wants to start the trial Monday, I'll start the trial Monday. If he wants to start discovery Monday, I will start EBTs Monday of the plaintiffs, and I will continue on a daily basis until they're done.

If he wants EBTs of my guys, the guys I control I will make available to him immediately. The ones I don't control are his option to serve subpoenas on for non-party witnesses.

I have an absolute defense in this case, Judge. There is no wage loss in this case when you consider that Mr. Marino paid them a salary, he paid them tips, and he paid them meals. It adds up to more than the minimum wage.

I have an absolute defense to this sexual harassment charge. I have over 22 favorable declarations from -- ten of them probably are from independent witnesses who no longer work at the restaurant who have no reason to give me a declaration, who have no reason to say what they're saying in his defense.

Now, as far as not appearing before your Honor, he had absolutely no notice to appear. Mr. Marino, although he speaks English, has a little trouble understanding. We had to get an

Italian interpreter in the criminal trial.

Mr. Cavanaugh never advised him of the appearance. He never advised him of the show cause order. I wish to bring to your Honor's attention the case of *Cody v. Mello*, 59 Fed.3d 13 where in that Court, that Court offered an alternate default against the plaintiff in that case, and it was reversed by the Court of Appeals, Federal Court of Appeals on the basis that the defendants had no knowledge of the court appearance, and their non-appearance was not willful.

The Court stated in that case in the last sentence that the "extreme sanction of a default judgment must remain a weapon of last resort rather than first resort."

Your Honor, all I could say is we are staying with the defendant now. There were reasons why the three defendants, the attorneys left them. We're staying with him. I'm here for the trial. I'm 78-years-old, and I promise you before I pass away, I'll finish this trial. There's no delay being asked for by the defendants, and the default judgment would be extremely prejudiced in this case. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WISNIEWSKI: Your Honor, may I be heard?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. WISNIEWSKI: Yes. I'll be brief.

THE COURT: Anything else from defendants before I hear from Mr. Wisniewski? Mr. Cavanaugh, did you want to say something else?

MR. CAVANAUGH: Your Honor, only briefly in that I agree with Mr. Rispoli. I never did notify the defendants, my clients, because at that point I was actually told to have no contact with them, so I did not notify them and was under the belief that Mr. Lugara was representing them, but I would agree with Mr. Rispoli that the defendants should not be sanctioned to that extent, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: So what happened to Mr. Lugara? Because I had received several pieces of correspondence from him.

MR. RISOLI: Your Honor, Mr. Lugara this morning sent me an email that says that he couldn't attend this appearance today because he's the best man in a wedding in Pennsylvania. I would like to submit it to the Court. I have a copy for Mr. Wisniewski.

But further I would like to state to the Court I have all the defendants present here except one, your Honor, who is out of the country.

THE COURT: And what do you say, Mr. Risoli -- and, again, I'm granting you the indulgence of hearing you because, as I've indicated, I'm not going to permit the defendants to add another lawyer into the case, but what do you say to the argument that I told the defendants back in April of 2011 that there was to be no more substitution of counsel, and that if they persisted in this tactic of retaining lawyers and then not paying them, they were going to be required to proceed pro se.

What do you say to that?

MR. RISOLI: Your Honor, as I read the minutes -- I have them here. As I read the minutes of that hearing, you said, "if he retains new counsel or discharges counsel." You said if he does that, then you are going to make him proceed pro se, which means your Honor would tolerate no further delay in the case. He would go on by himself.

He is not asking for any delay, Judge. I'm not asking for any delay. I'm ready to go. He's got attorneys that are ready to go immediately at your Honor's discretion.

THE COURT: Well, I have to tell you that when Mr. Cavanaugh came into the case in April of 2011, and he told me he was ready to go, he told me there would be no delay, he told me that his clients were interested in a rapid resolution of the matter, etc., etc., and that's not what happened.

Instead, what happened is a repeat of what had happened with other lawyers that had been involved in the case previously.

I do have to take very seriously what Mr. Wisniewski has said about the prejudice that his clients have suffered as a result of the passage of time. I have to consider the fact that I was very clear back in April of 2011 that I would not tolerate any more of this behavior. It continued nonetheless.

I have to consider the failure to appear at the conference on April 16, the failure to respond to the order to show cause. I have been told by Mr. Cavanaugh this afternoon

that he had some problems with a server, but obviously that doesn't excuse an attorney from keeping track of what's going on with the docket of cases of which he is still counsel of record. So, there isn't any justifiable excuse that I can see on this record for what's happened. That's where we are.

Mr. Wisniewski, anything else you want to say?

MR. WISNIEWSKI: Yes, your Honor, I'll be very brief. Mr. Risoli made assertions basically without any legal support that Mr. Marino has defenses to wage and hour violations. We've submitted to you a substantial memorandum of law on that issue and we submitted to you the pay stubs. If you read the memorandum of law, all of the authorities, and you review the pay stubs, on their face they're violations of law.

For example, initially he pays waitresses \$10 per day, per day, when they've worked, eight, ten, 12 hours, OK? That's one dollar per hour. Even assuming a tip credit, the guy is short three or four dollars per hour. He doesn't pay them overtime. When he gets sued initially, your Honor, he switches. He pays them the alleged tip credit minimum wage of \$4.60, but as you will see from the pay stubs, if people work over 40 hours, he still pays them at the regular rate, not the overtime rate. Your Honor, these are Exhibits 12 to 15 of our initial application. All you have to do is look at the pay stubs. So Mr. Risoli's assertions are simply incorrect.

Secondly, Mr. Risoli makes very strong accusations

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against me and my clients and also against Mr. Cavanaugh. example, in his letter he accuses my clients of conspiring and for me to be part of that conspiracy that somehow we are blackmailing him. I want to make it plain to you, your Honor, because the plaintiffs knew the defendant Izabela Marino, who is married to Mr. Marino right there, OK, they didn't want her to be hurt so much because they were friendly with her. Because when the case was not resolved through settlement, we amended our pleadings as a right. That was no blackmail. was just a sensitivity to one of the defendants. We don't care about Mr. Marino clearly, but they cared about Izabela Marino, a young woman who is married to Mr. Marino, and with whom she has a two- or three-year-old child. That was the reason behind it, not blackmail. Mr. Risoli is very liberal of accusing other attorneys of criminal conduct here, including accusing Mr. Cavanaugh of allegedly running some money laundering scheme.

Now, Mr. Risoli's claim that the defendant didn't know is absurd. Three lawyers knew or should have known. Even if Mr. Cavanaugh had a power outage for several months, and I'm sorry to say, but Mr. Cavanaugh has not submitted any proof of such a power outage, OK, then you have Lugara who in late January or early February writes to you and he says I'm representing these people. What, Lugara doesn't check the docket?

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We also have Mr. Risoli who files a notice of appearance on April 24. Why? He doesn't check the docket? He doesn't check the docket that several days later you issue another order? Well, you have to say that clearly the defendants knew, the defendants knew through their legal representatives, their lawyers.

As I put in my reply memorandum to you, Judge, if there is an issue, maybe the proper venue is the Supreme Court next door for a malpractice lawsuit against Mr. Risoli and Mr. Lugara, OK? Maybe that is the proper solution. But clearly you shouldn't punish plaintiffs in this case, and certainly since you've already made the decision not to allow Mr. Risoli to represent, because this will be a circus. Mr. Risoli says he is ready to proceed. But I am not, your As my 20-page letter to you details, there's substantial deficiencies in the defendant's discovery The deficiencies that were the result of the production. contumacious conduct because they were told to produce everything, and they didn't. OK? That has not been resolved, so we cannot start with depositions on Monday, your Honor. will take us months to start depositions. It will take me days to locate people, people who two years ago or a year ago were available. Now I'll be looking for them.

Mr. Risoli makes this bold statement that he has 22 declarations. Where are they? They should have submitted them

as part of their application here. OK?

Your Honor, you have been very generous with the defendants here, and the time has come to pull down the curtain on this farce which has been the defendant's conduct. Thank you very much.

MR. RISOLI: Your Honor, he's given you about 15 reasons why he can't proceed in this case; not why the defendants can't proceed. He's telling you he lost these people.

Your Honor, I have a tape of Mr. Wisniewski interviewing somebody trying to get her to join into this suit. No matter how many times she told him that Mr. Marino was not guilty of any wage violation was not guilty of any sexual violation, he continued for over 50 pages of transcript to try to convince her to join this suit. This case was produced and directed by Mr. Wisniewski, right? I sent a letter to your Honor asking you to consider having him appear as a witness for the defense in this case on the grounds that there was no sexual harassment allegations originally in this case, right?

Judge, there's no delay here. There's no delay.

These people were paid the proper wage. There was no sexual harassment.

Let me say as a last thing that Mr. Marino has been in business for 16 years in this restaurant. He's gone through how many thousands of waitresses and wages, and this is the

first time this has ever come up. He has never been guilty or never been accused of anything like this, and this is the first time. He has a right to defend himself, your Honor, and prove that these allegations are false, both the wage allegations and the sexual harassment.

The last thing I want to say, Judge, before I sit down, I see on the electronic filing now that there's four additional names listed who I don't know who they are, right? Are we to expect another amended complaint? I don't understand what their names are doing there, but I don't know if we are to expect another amended complaint. We've now answered the four amended complaints which were over a thousand pages.

Judge, we need a trial in this case. We're ready to go to trial Monday. If he needs time to find his people, let him find his people. Let's go to trial and dispose of this case on the merits the way every case should be disposed of. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to --

MR. WISNIEWSKI: Your Honor, I have to address just two issues. OK? I have to say, Mr. Marino had dispatched his mistress, Ms. Natalia Odegova to tape me. OK? Fine. There were two lawyers who reviewed those tapes somehow and while they were alluded to previously, OK, certainly, certainly if they had been so explosive, as Mr. Risoli says, there would have been other proceedings.

But I wish to tell you, OK, if Mr. Risoli since he raised this issue, there will be testimony that Ms. Odegova was his mistress. It will be testimony by her roommate who saw Ms. Odegova and Mr. Marino in the room next door. Perhaps Mr. Risoli doesn't know this.

Secondly, clearly, Mr. Risoli doesn't understand wage and hour cases. The reason there have been people here who aren't listed in the caption is because they filed consents to joinder pursuant to a distribution of a notice of pendency under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The reason there have been amendments is because other people have joined. Ms. Lisovskaya has joined. Ms. Synyuk has joined. And Mr. Moin Uddin has joined.

Your Honor, we've given you reasons why you should pull down the curtain on this farce, and it will be a farce, it does seem to me, if you were to reconsider your decision to not allow Mr. Risoli to represent Mr. Marino. But this is what you are going to expect, OK? Instead of focusing on wage violations and the allegations, there will be allegations about Cavanaugh running a drug operation and me engaging in conspiracy — boldfaced allegations unsupported by anything. And I would like you to consider sanctions against Mr. Risoli for making such statements in open court.

THE COURT: All right. I've heard enough.

MR. RISOLI: Your Honor, one last thing. There should

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               THE COURT: No. I've heard enough.
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               MR. RISOLI: There should be a deadline to add people
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      to these cases.
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               THE COURT: I said I've heard enough.
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               MR. RISOLI: OK.
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               THE COURT: The lawyers will give to the court
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      reporter the correct spellings of all the names that have been
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     mentioned in today's proceedings. I'll take under advisement
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      the notice for default judgment.
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               MR. WISNIEWSKI: Thank you.
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               (Adjourned)
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